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What farmers know: Experiential knowledge and care in vine growing 
Anna Krzywoszynska 
Forthcoming (2015) in Sociologia Ruralis. 
Abstract 
This article contributes to the critical debate on the choreographies of care in farming (Law 2010) 
through an exploration of the inter-dependence of care and situated expertise in the context of 
vine work. It argues that care as the totality of those activities which enable the maintenance, 
continuation, and repair of the farming ‘world’, to paraphrase Fisher and Tronto’s (1991) classic 
definition, depends on experiential knowledge. According to Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) 
attentiveness, responsiveness, and adaptation to the material environment are characteristic of 
high levels of experiential expertise. Attentiveness, responsiveness, and adaptation are also 
what characterises good care (Tronto 1993, Mol 2008). Through an autoethnographic account 
of acquiring competence in vine work, the article illustrates how through practical engagement 
with the material and social environment of the farm key elements of the logic of care (Mol 2008) 
are acquired. In conclusions, the paper indicates some consequences of putting experiential 
knowledge at the heart of multi-scalar and multi-temporal cares farmers are increasingly asked 
to attend to.  
Keywords: skill, experiential knowledge, plants, care, autoethnography 
1. Introduction 
The notion of care is becoming central to the current reconceptualisations of agrarian space and 
practice. Farmers both self-identify and are encouraged to see themselves as stewards of the 
land, investing in the future of their soils, crops, and crafts, and by extension our shared 
economies, environments, and health. Farms are also seen as key spaces in which to address 
the multiple cares of food security, environmental conservation (Burgess 2000, Kaljonen 2006, 
Morris 2006, Riley 2008), and bio-security (Ilbery et al. 2012, Law and Mol 2008), and become 
sites of audit, regulation, and control in the interest of those systemic, though locally enacted, 
cares. This article contributes to the critical debate on the choreographing of cares in farming 
(Law 2010) through an exploration of the inter-dependence of care and situated expertise. What 
this article argues is that care as the totality of those activities which enable the maintenance, 
continuation, and repair of the farming ‘world’, to paraphrase Fisher and Tronto’s (1991) classic 
definition, depends on experiential knowledge. This paper firstly contributes to critical reflection 
on theories of care though an autoethnographic exploration of the centrality of experiential 
knowledge to enactment of care in vine growing. It illustrates how through practical 
engagement with the material and social environment of the farm key elements of the logic of 
care (Mol 2008): attentiveness, responsibility, and competency (Tronto 1993) are acquired. 
Secondly, it makes a call for recognition of experiential knowledge as central to the delivery of 
the multiple cares we are increasingly expecting and demanding of farmers today.  
That good care is essential to good farming has now been suggested by a number of authors 
(Harbers 2010, Singleton 2010, Law 2010, Singleton and Law 2013). To date, care in farming has 
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been largely considered in the context of human-animal relations, and has drawn on the 
intellectual tradition of post-humanist studies which explore the affective and ethical 
dimensions of human-animal interactions (e.g. Holloway 2002, 2007). Mass killings during the 
foot and mouth outbreak has led some authors to question the assumed connection between 
care and affect, and to point to the tensions inherent in the spatial and temporal enactments of 
care (Law 2010, Law and Mol 2011). Care was no longer considered specific to human-animal 
interactions, but begun to be seen as a patterning of activities which support certain kinds of 
farming, and which can come into tension with other ways of organising the times and spaces 
of modern agriculture (Harbers 2010, Singleton 2010, Singleton and Law 2013). This 
understanding of care as a patterning of activities, or choreography (Law 2010), is important in 
that it extends the field of inquiry from specific interactions to the whole farm, and to the 
multiple realities farm activities contribute to and are influenced by, such as markets and 
regulatory regimes. In the context of this article, the notion of care is applied to human-vine 
relations, showing how in the acts of vine pruning a number of inter-acting cares inherent to 
grape growing in enacted, such as care for the vintage, for the marketability of the wine, for the 
longevity of the vineyard, and others. 
This new understanding of care in farming is consistent with that proposed by feminist critiques, 
which understand care as not a sentiment or a kindness, something ‘we can’t afford’, a sort of 
‘extra’ added on to efficient and rational technologies and knowledges. Quite the contrary, care 
is seen as the totality of practices that makes these technologies and knowledges work. As in 
feminist critiques, also in farming we can understand care as a non-normative obligation, as 
‘more than an affective-ethical state: it involves material engagement in labours to sustain 
interdependent worlds’ (de la Bellacasa 2012: 198). Thus in this paper care is understood as an 
ethos (de la Bellacasa 2010), a form of practical rationality (Ruddick 1990), or a logic (Mol 2008, 
Mol et al. 2010); in other words care as a practice rather than a principle or an emotion.  
What this paper goes on to argue is that the delivery of care as a set of practices depends on 
expert situated knowledge. That care cannot be enacted though external systems of audit and 
ordering has been intimated by other authors: Singleton showed how the auditing of the Cattle 
Tracing System both colonised the practices of care on the farm, and was dependent on them 
for its existence (2010, and Law 2013), while Enticott made a similar argument for vet’s 
enactment of bovine tuberculosis screening (2012). Feminist critiques of care have also pointed 
out that care requires both know-what and know-how, as it depends on one’s ability to first 
recognise and then appropriately react to the identified need (Tronto 1993). While abstract 
knowledge may serve as a starting point for learning practices of care, experiential, situated, 
and often tacit knowledge is what enables care to be carried out, in farming and in other 
contexts (e.g. Mol 2008 on diabetes). Experiential knowledge can thus be seen as both a pre-
requisite for care, and as a result of care, as through carrying out care as practice one may 
acquire further experience, which in turn should enable better caring.  
In this article I explore the connection between experiential knowledge and care through an 
autoethnographic case study of acquiring competence in farming grape vines. This methodology 
allows me to explore in depth the process of acquiring a particular farming skill, and its 
connection to care. While the importance of experiential knowledge in farming has been already 
acknowledged, to date there has been no account of how such knowledge is acquired, a gap this 
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article addresses. Furthermore, an autoethnographic account allows me to systematically 
illustrate the inter-dependencies between experiential knowledge and care indicated in existing 
literature. According to Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) attentiveness, responsiveness, and 
adaptation to the material environment, be it in growing plants or other practices, are 
characteristic of high levels of expertise. Crucially, attentiveness, responsiveness, and 
adaptation are also what characterises good care (Tronto 1993, Mol 2008). I thus suggest that 
good care can only be delivered by those practitioners who have a situated and experiential 
understanding of the world of action (for a related argument see Enticott 2012). The following 
autoethnographic case study explores how this high level of situated expertise is acquired in the 
context of vine growing, and how it enables vine care. In the conclusion, I discuss some of the 
consequences that recognising experiential knowledge of farming as true expertise and a 
cornerstone of caring for agricultural natures may have for how we manage those environments.  
2. Experiential knowledge and care: a synthesis 
 
2.1 Farmers and experiential knowledge  
In order to explore the inter-dependencies between care and experiential knowledge in farming 
we need to get to grips with the mechanisms through which experiential knowledge is acquired, 
and with the characteristics of experiential knowledge as different from other kinds of knowing. 
Most studies of farming knowledge explore its inter-personal dimension, using such frameworks 
as knowledge-cultures (Tsouvalis et al. 2000, Morris 2006, Riley 2008, McGreevy 2012), 
communities of practice (Oreszczyn et al. 2010), knowledge systems (Kroma 2005, Reyes-Garcia 
et al. 2014), knowledge communities (Nerbonne and Lentz 2003) and knowledge networks 
(Winter 1995, Silgo and Massey 2007).  Central to these perspectives is the notion that 
‘knowledge is a social achievement, produced in specific spatial and temporal contexts as people 
collectively try to make sense of things and develop (unspoken) rules for doing so’ (Morris and 
Holloway 2009: 321). This research has contributed much to current understandings of farming 
knowledge, and shown that farmers value and use different kinds of knowledges, including 
‘those developed through practical experience of agriculture, and the management of its 
natures’ (Morris 2006: 125). These knowledges are variously referred to in the agro-food context 
as tacit (Morgan and Murdoch 2000), local (Clark and Murdoch 1997, Raymond et al. 2010), 
embodied (Carolan 2008), experiential (Goven and Morris 2012), or traditional (Berkes et al. 
2000). 
While the inter-personal dimension has been shown to be important to farmers’ ways of 
knowing, crucially tacit, local, or experiential knowledge is seen to arise first of all through a 
direct relationship between farmers and the agro-ecology of the farm. Authors stress the 
importance of prolonged lived experience to the shaping of this kind of knowing. However, 
exactly how this knowledge is acquired has not been explored to date, a gap this article 
addresses. Tacit or experiential knowledge arises through and focuses on the relevant farming 
activity, be it cultivation of a particular plant (Van der Ploeg 1993) or animal species (Wynne 
1992, Grasseni 2004, Singleton 2010, Holloway and Morris 2014), or a management of 
ecosystems typical of the farm (Burgess et al. 2000, Riley 2008). This way of knowing is seen as 
‘personal and context-dependent, and as such (…) difficult if not impossible to communicate 
other than through personal interaction in a context of shared experiences’ (Goven and Morris 
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2012: 161, my emphasis). It is a form of knowledge that emphasises knowledge as practice as 
well as cognition (Morris 2010: 79). While farmers may be able to explain some aspects of what 
they do (Riley 2008), the acquisition of this knowledge happens not through ‘being told’, but 
experientially, through a directing of attention in the processes of doing (Ingold 2000). The 
autoethnographic case study presented in this article provides some empirical grounding to 
these largely theoretical literatures. 
2.2 Farming as skill/craft 
Recognising this centrality of the material world to the acquisition of tacit knowledge requires 
us to look much more closely at the relationship between farmers and their environments, and 
to explore how particular kinds of agrarian skill are acquired, which is what this article addresses 
in the context of vine work. One of the main findings about processes of enskillment (Ingold 
2011), or of mind-bodies making sense (Harrison 2000) of the world of action is that sensing and 
sensation are central for the interaction between mind-body and its environment in the process 
of learning (Crossley 2007, Gieser 2008, Lea 2009). A skilled practitioner is aware of the world of 
their practice through diverse sensory inputs (Hockney and Allen-Collinson 2009, Paxson 2012), 
and they have a capacity to be affected, that is to become sensitive to the world, to be moved 
by it and to be ‘put into motion by new entities whose differences are registered in new and 
unexpected ways’ (Latour 2004, p. 210). But perception in itself is not enough, as to consider an 
enskilled body is to ask – what can a body do, in its environment? (Harrison 2000, p. 504). 
Becoming skilled means becoming attuned to the particular ways in which the material or 
environment unfolds, and to understand one’s capacity to participate in this unfolding. Roof 
workers learn how to keep their balance (Strati 1999), care workers how to perceive unspoken 
needs of their patients (Yakhlef and Essén 2012), and glass-blowers how to anticipate changes 
in molten glass (O’Connor 2007). Thus ‘education of attention’ (Gieser 2008, Ingold 2000) can 
really be seen as a process of getting to know the world of action, and one’s capacities to interact 
with it. Enskillment can thus be understood as an ongoing exploration and alignment of 
properties and actions, a never-ending experimental engagement in which both humans and 
materials both change and mutate. As a result of this centrality of the material to acquisition of 
skill,  
‘an account of the development of proficiency must attend not only to the development of 
bodily techniques (…) but also to the material of practice itself and the forged sensibilities of the 
material’s properties in practice.’ (O’Connor 2007: 138). 
2.3 The inter-dependence of expertise and care 
 
There is a striking similarity between the capacities characteristic of high levels of enskillment, 
and those which are seen as necessary to the enactment of care. The literature discussed above 
suggests that farming skill can be seen as an awareness of the farming environment, an attention 
to the changes in this environment, and a capacity to intervene at the appropriate time and in 
the appropriate way. Judging the appropriateness of action is where the question of care comes 
into play. Caring is different from simply making choices. As Mol (2008) argues, choices are seen 
as value-neutral, informed by objective information, and resulting from rational analysis of all 
known variables. In making choices, knowledge, action, and evaluation are separated – know 
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first, then act, evaluate later. Caring, on the other hand, does not separate knowledges, values 
and actions. When decisions are made, they are based on recognition that we cannot know all 
the possible variables, and that therefore we may not be able to foresee all the possible 
outcomes, but that we need to do something nonetheless. As a result caring is both 
experimental and ongoing. It has an implicit temporality and situatedness. While in the logic of 
choice the actor is separate from the world of action, and can leave the engagement at any time, 
the logic of care implies a continuity, and an interdependence.  
Good care requires attentiveness, responsiveness, and adaptation in the face of always changing 
circumstances. And attentiveness, responsiveness, and adaptation are elements of true 
competence, as demonstrated by Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ (1986) influential five-stage model of 
human learning. Dreyfus and Dreyfus show that as practitioners gain experience, they learn to 
recognise more and more variables in the environment of their action, which requires them to 
develop prioritisation. While novice and beginner practitioners proceed mechanistically in 
accordance to a pre-set ‘programme’, competent and more advanced actors engage actively 
with their environments, constantly drawing and re-drawing their plans in response to the 
situation. Strict procedures which were depended on in earlier stages of learning are abandoned 
in favour of flexible adaptation. Attending to the world of action gains in importance, as does 
personal responsibility. As Flyvbjerg explains 
‘the novice and the advanced beginner have only limited responsibility for the 
consequences of their actions [as these are] predetermined by (…) fixed learned rules. 
Excluding a gross error, a bad result will therefore appear as having been caused by 
inadequately specified elements and rules. (…) Competent performers, on the other hand, 
are personally involved with their actions. [They] feel responsible for the consequences of 
the choice (…) because selecting a plan [of action] cannot be done objectively, but must 
nevertheless be carried out in order to be able to act competently.’ (2001, p. 13) 
Thus expert action implies judgement, and caring about its results. Competent and expert 
practitioners feel a responsibility for the world in which they act. Action is no longer value-free; 
it is guided by subjective assessment of how best to proceed.  
It is important to note that the behaviours and attitudes characterised by Mol (2008) as 
indicative of the logic of choice (separation of facts, actions, and values, limited personal 
responsibility, and closure) correspond to behaviours and attitudes typical of novices as noted 
by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986), while those she characterises as typical to the logic of care (see 
above) correspond to those Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) see as typical of competent and expert 
actors. In the context of farming, we can thus see that caring well – for a plant, an animal, a farm 
– can only be achieved by experts in their fields (Riley 2008). Care is not possible when the 
practitioner cares more about adhering to the rules and procedures than they do about doing 
the right thing, as doing the right thing is always contextual, local, and temporary. For beginners 
what constitutes ‘the right thing’ is judged in relation to rules, not in relation to the exigencies 
of the moment. In contrast, experts analyse the situation, not the rules, and do what normally 
works (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2005: 788). Thus to care well requires a level of expertise which 
goes beyond rule adherence. This has been commented on by Enticott (2012), who observed 
that experienced vets move beyond the protocol in testing for bovine tuberculosis. They note 
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that ‘[r]ather than unthinking automatons, [for experienced vets] knowing the test invokes a 
caring relationship, one for the farmer and the cattle. In this relationship, universalities do not 
apply (…) Care is situated in immediate localised relations and the ability to make these 
judgements is what distinguishes veterinary care from the veterinary identity defined by the 
protocol’ (p. 83). The importance of moving beyond rules and towards attentiveness to the 
world of matter in vine care will be further explored in the following sections.  
2.4 Caring for plants 
Care in farming has to date been associated mainly with caring for animals, both in life (Holloway 
2002, 2007) and in death (Singleton 2010). However, once we conceptualise care not as an 
extension of sentiment, but as a set of practices which enable the maintenance and continuation 
of a world, other farming non-humans, such as plants, can also be seen as objects of care. Care 
for plants, like the care for animals or humans, requires attentiveness and responsiveness, which 
in turn require a knowledge of what a ‘good plant life’ is. Where humans and some animals are 
more readily accessible to this kind of knowing, the alterity of plants presents practitioners with 
particular challenges. Plants are often seen to defy and indeed overbear human intentions, and 
control rather than care is more often evoked in relation to plants, as through their capacity for 
continuous, vigorous and unassisted growth they resist human attempts at containment 
(Hitchings 2003, Barker 2008, Ginn 2008)1. Some authors suggest that the perceived unruliness 
and obstinacy of plants arises from issues of temporal disjuncture (Bingham 2008) between 
plant and human activities (Richardson-Ngwenya 2012). Harmonious, or at least 
accommodating human-plant interactions, on the other hand, require humans to become 
attuned to and affected by the multiple temporalities of plants (Cloke and Jones 2001, Franklin 
2006, Brice 2014).  
Temporality emerges thus as an important element for understanding how to care for plants. 
The other element to consider is plants’ relationality. Although rooted in a place, plants exist 
through their mutually impactful relations with others. Plants are promiscuous and 
opportunistic in enrolling various human, non-human and elemental others to further their 
growth and reproduction (Atchinson and Head 2013); they are also highly sensitive and 
adaptable to their environments. Plants are indeed so entangled in their environments as to 
challenge simple distinctions between individuals and collectives, landscapes and their 
constituents.2 Caring for plants requires then knowledge of their involvement with multiple 
networks, including soils, climates, and pests. How this knowledge is acquired will be explored 
in the following sections. 
3. Learning to care for vines 
In the light of the literature discussed above, the following account illustrates the co-emergence 
of experiential knowledge and care in acquiring competence in vine work. As the only way to 
get to know embodied aspects of working knowledge is by doing it (McMorran 2012), this paper 
is informed by a nine month period of autoethnography as an apprentice vineyard worker at 
Colli Verdi, a winemaking cooperative in the Piemonte region in Italy. 34  While I conducted 
participatory observation at another three wineries and interviews at another sixteen, at Colli 
Verdi my engagement with vines, vineyards and vineyard workers was the most comprehensive. 
The winery participated in the WWOOF programme 5, and the vineyard workers were well 
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accustomed to training new vine apprentices. At the same time, Colli Verdi was dedicated to a 
care for their workforce which distinguished it from other wineries where vineyard workforce 
was typically seasonal. At Colli Verdi high level of employment was maintained throughout the 
year, and workers who may have trouble obtaining paid jobs elsewhere, such as an ex-convict, 
and a person with a slight mental disability, were employed when possible.  
As a result of this wide intake, the existing workforce exhibited a variety in their vine skill. The 
‘core’ of the vineyard team consisted of Damian, Peter, and Lena, who had worked the vineyards 
since the 1990s. Damian, a gardener by training, was the caposquadra (team leader). He had 
learnt vine pruning from practical experience and instruction by Virgilio, the founding father of 
the cooperative, whom he still consulted. Virgilio, like all viticulturists I had met in my research, 
had learnt to work vines by helping his father and other experienced vine workers (traditionally 
vine work is male-dominated). Lena was the only person in the team with formal viticulture 
training; all others acquired their skill ‘on the job’, although some had supplemented this with 
theoretical courses. A varying number of apprentices, and temporary workers, including the 
author, completed the ‘team’. The diversity of vineyards managed by the cooperative, differing 
in vine type, vine age, soil type and parcel size, added to the complexity. At Colli I found a 
dedication to hands-on work in the vineyards combined with extreme heterogeneity of both 
vines and workers, from young to old, from experienced to novice, and from skilful to inept, 
which allowed me to build a comprehensive picture of vine pruning practice acquisition and 
performance. While I cannot claim to have become a fully competent vine worker (a moving 
goalpost by its very nature), my experiences of vine apprenticeship have offered important 
insights into what it takes to be one (Grasseni 2004, O’Connor 2007, Lea 2009). Using my body 
‘as an instrument of research’ (Longhurst et al. 2008), I become a sympathetic participant 
(Rowles 1980) in viticulturalists’ lifeworld.  
To best convey the dynamism and sensuality the training, I illustrate my narratives with a video 
taken during my vine apprenticeship. This allows me to get close to particular moments of 
human-nonhuman sensuous encounter in the performance of practice. It helps to illustrate the 
embodied aspects of vine work, including dexterity and strength, and hopefully will help the 
readers to share the sense of alien-ness and strangeness which informed by early engagements 
with vines. 
4. Learning to be affected by vines 
The branches, although dead for months now, are still holding on to the wires with their thin but 
incredibly strong tendrils. The vine is further attached to the wires by plastic bands, and the 
branches are plaited into the wires and into one another. Pulling them off is difficult. The 
branches are hard and springy, when you pull at them sharply you run the risk of having them 
whip back, suddenly free, straight into your face. And that hurts! The branches are knobbly, 
tangled, long things, one completely different from another. Just when you think you’ve got it 
down, think again – one of the tiny little off-branches jerks you suddenly back, or one of the 
tendrils you missed nearly pulls the branch back out of your hand. We all work in gloves to protect 
our hands. After just a few minutes my back and arms start complaining, and I’m sweating in 
spite of the cold. (based on field diary 30/01/09) 
Fig 1. and 2. 
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My first encounter with vines comes in the middle of winter. After the madness of the harvest 
both the vines and the workers enjoy a brief time off and pruning starts shortly after Christmas. 
Like in most vineyards in Italy, at Colli pruning is done by hand. Experienced workers are followed 
by novices, who pull down the cut-off branches from the wires. This is what I am struggling to 
do. My actions are awkward, and I tire quickly. I am amazed at the strength of the thin canes; I 
can feel their power in my whole body as they resist me. We test one another. Lena and Peter 
see me become increasingly agitated at the vines’ obstinate, unyielding material. They help, 
showing me some tricks of the trade: cutting the branches up at the tangles, so that they don’t 
catch; pulling with your entire upper body by turning away from the vine instead of pulling down 
just with the arms. Lena shows me the movement (fig. 1 & 2), and I try to imitate her. I watch 
Peter cut up the branches, and try to use my secateurs to the same effect. My back and fingers 
hurt, my feet are cold in the melting slush. It is not just me; we are all working hard, moving 
through the rows at a slow but constant speed. There are twenty hectares of vineyards at Colli 
Verdi. Winter is shaping up to be a long and bleak season indeed.  
4.1. Vine pruning as enactment of cares 
Vine pruning is a site where multiple cares are simultaneously enacted through the interaction 
between workers and plants. The aim of vine pruning is to ‘hold back’ the vigour of the vine 
which would otherwise channel much of its power into producing ever-more extensive networks 
of branches. Instead, the workers aim to direct the force of the plant into the production of 
grapes. This growth is further curtailed and directed as the number of grape bunches and the 
density of foliage is managed throughout the growing season. How a vine is pruned, how many 
bunches it is made to carry, and how its foliage is managed speaks to the overarching aims of 
the winery as a producer of particular kinds of wines; it both embodies and enacts the care for 
the winery as a commercial entity. To simplify, some industrial scale wineries prune the vines 
mechanically, prioritising cost and speed over quality of grapes. Conversely, small wineries such 
as Colli Verdi see the work done in the vineyards as the site of quality production.  
This is not to say, however, that the aims of the winery to produce a certain type of wine 
automatically translate into workers’ pruning decisions. Pruning vines is not an arbitrary process, 
but an activity shaped by the innate disposition of the vine to grow in a certain way, and a desire 
of the viticulturalist for certain outcomes. Pruning is a mutual accomplishment, re-negotiated 
each time the pruner and the vine meet. Good pruning holds in balance caring for the harvest 
and caring for the plant. Keeping these cares together (Taylor 2010) requires skilful interactions 
with the vines which are sensitive to both the needs of the plant (to live, to be healthy), and of 
the winery (to produce a certain kind of wine in a certain quantity). This in turn requires both a 
deep understanding of how vines in particular vineyards grow, react, and unfold, and of the 
transformation from grape to wine in this particular company. This kind of understanding does 
not exist in abstraction, but is derived from long-term interaction with the environment of the 
winery.  
For a novice like me, the alterity of vine pruning is enormous; no amount of kinaesthetic 
alignment (Gieser 2008) can help me understand what is going on. While I continue to work in 
the vineyards, I also talk to the winemakers and try the wines, and start to mentally connect 
certain vineyards with certain wine labels. Basic rules are explained to me, both at the winery 
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and at the vineyard; but the knowledge of the rules does not automatically gear me up for action. 
Winter pruning is a case in point. I am told that at Colli Verdi most vines are pruned Guyot style, 
in which one fruit-bearing cane and one spur are left on the trunk. The cane will produce fruit in 
the coming season, while the spur will become the cane in two seasons’ time. So far so good. 
The problems start when I task myself with ‘finding’ the cane and the spur in the branchy maze 
of an unpruned vine. No matter how often the difference between the trunk of the vine and the 
spur is explained to me, no matter how many times it is shown to me even, I do not see where 
the spur and the cane ‘reside’. I run my fingers along the wood, I try to figure it out, but the 
mute, obtuse matter of the winter vine gives nothing away to me. I lack the perceptual 
competence of the knowledgeable worker; I do not know how to look, how to touch, how to 
feel. Through the pulling down of branches, and observing experienced workers, I attain some 
understanding of the affordances of the vine. I appreciate its strength, and its resilience to the 
deep cuts made into its flesh. But all I need to know is not there. I start to understand what is 
‘going on’ on an abstract level, but I cannot do. Which is why, of course, novice vine workers are 
not allowed to cut winter vines. 
4.2 Learning and the role of changing affordances  
Winter vines present a static image of vines which belays their true nature as dynamic and 
unfolding entities. To be able to care for vines, I need to acquire a knowledge of their changing 
materiality, something that becomes possible in the spring. Spring signals the start of the green 
pruning season, which continues through various tasks practically until the harvest.6 In spring 
vines allow me to engage with them in a new way.  
The vines have advanced quite a bit since I last saw them as sad, leafless stumps. I never realised 
how dynamically they grew! They are producing shoots all over – from the very base, foot, of the 
vine, on the ‘nod’ where the old wood (the non-pruned part) meets new wood (the pruned part), 
from the spur,  and from the cane. They don’t look like much now, but each of those subtle green 
shoots has the capacity to become a woody, proper branch, and most of them are ready to carry 
fruit too. Shoots are lovely to touch... Sensually, it is a completely different experience to winter 
pruning. Before, I was struggling. Now, on the contrary, I have to pay special attention and be 
extra delicate to make sure I don’t do damage (Peter told me I ought to ‘caress the vine’ at this 
stage). The touch carries a lot of responsibility – but not as much as in winter pruning, as the vine 
will continue putting out new shoots for a while yet, so any minor mistakes can be corrected later 
by leaving additional shoots. After all, I am allowed to do this work after a fifteen-minute tutorial, 
not a three-year hands-on training! There is more to see now, the vine seems more alive, and it 
is easier for me to start to think about the force it will need to create grapes, about how many 
grapes it can support, which branches it can develop, see it as a totality, a living thing. The shoots 
are a beautiful light green, and they are extremely vulnerable and brittle, they pop off the branch 
at the most delicate touch. You hardly need tools, we work with our hands. Soon they get covered 
in fragrant vine juice, it smells lovely, a fresh, green smell. (based on field diary 05/05/2009) 
Spring vines exhibit a different set of affordances to winter vines, with a consequent change in 
my affective engagement with them, as the research diary excerpt illustrates. After Lorimer, I 
understand affordance to be a relational quality, arising from the meeting of ‘the inherent, 
ecological characteristics of a nonhuman in relation to the phenomenological apparatus of the 
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body (human or nonhuman) that encounters and perceives them’ (2007, p. 914). In this reading 
recognition and responsiveness do not exclusively depend on conscious efforts of a human actor, 
but are influenced by what the nonhuman being interacted with has to offer. Certain meetings 
make it easier to respond than others; it is easier for humans to connect with a panda than with 
an ant, or indeed a plant (see Lorimer 2007). While winter vines offered little purchase for my 
attempts at interaction, spring vines are more welcoming. The primary affordance of spring 
vines is the speed of their growth. By observing the development of tiny speckles of green into 
flower bunches into grapes, by attending daily to the rapid development of branches and leafs, 
I start to perceive vines as dynamic, unfolding entities, not mute, self-contained objects, and to 
become affected by them differently (Latour 2004). By being exposed to the dynamically 
growing vines I am able to develop an understanding not of the form of the vine before me, a 
knot of sticks and twigs, but of the vine’s unfolding, what Adam refers to as natura naturans, 
each vine’s own channelling of ‘the force which gives rise to (...) observable phenomena, the 
invisible energy that is recognisable only through its products’ (Adam 1998, p. 30). By relating 
these new experiences to the affordances I had encountered in winter: the strength of mature 
branches, or of the extensiveness of branch networks, I am able to build a fuller, temporal 
understanding of vine’s materiality.  
4.3 Communicating rules vs building awareness 
Importantly, the spring affordances of vines enable a change in practice, allowing me to move 
on from following and observing to hands-on action. As in winter pruning, the task is to remove 
undesirable growth. Knowing how to perform this task requires an understanding of why certain 
growth may not desirable at certain times and in certain places. Like other novices, I am 
instructed by an experienced worker. In her crash course on green pruning (see video), Lena 
draws my attention to particular occurrences in the vine – for example two shoots growing 
closely together out of a single bud. The importance of these and not other cues is concurrently 
explained with reference to particular human or vine activities in the past or in the future. If the 
shoots grow too close together they will interfere with one another’s growth, and make 
harvesting difficult. And so ‘a rule of thumb’ is to leave one shoot only, the one carrying grapes. 
But Lena tugs lightly at the second shoot of the pair, runs her fingers along it and locates a grape 
bunch. She explains she will ignore the rule this time as the grape yield this vintage is poor, and 
as both shoots are ‘nice’ and carry grape bunches. Both shoots stay on. 
The rule of thumb is not where Lena derives the solution for the case in front of her. She is not 
adhering to a rule, but using the rule to communicate how her action is informed by past 
experience of vine growth and harvesting technique, and her expectation of the future activities 
of the vine and of vine workers (see Ingold 2000, p. 35). Lena cares for the vine, but she also 
cares for the workers, including herself. By using a rule of thumb, Lena can communicate to me 
both what she is attending to, and why it is important to do so, while never resolving the tension 
between different cares – leaving the two shoots together as a local prioritisation of the care for 
the harvest over the care for the workers. The rule of thumb is not a description of ‘how the 
world is’ (a ‘know why’, as per Morris (2010)), but an interpretation which is only significant 
(which only signifies, i.e. makes sense (Harrison 2000)) in the context of the unfolding 
relationship between Lena, this vine, other vines, and other workers, across time. The rule of 
11 
 
thumb is thus both a didactic tool (‘attend to this’) and a crutch to lean on (‘I need to attend to 
this because’).  
The rule of thumb indicates a shared history of embodied experience, and so a certain 
temporality. Lena is engaging not just with what is in front of her right now, but considers all 
that may have come before, and all that may come after. The slow rhythms of vines result in 
epistemic distance (Carolan 2006): not all that is relevant can be perceived at one time. Even the 
past, seemingly the area of the known, is uncertain – Lena may have worked this vine before, 
but it is not possible to remember every single vine at every single stage of its development. 
There is no immediate feedback between action (of the worker) and reaction (from the material), 
and so no habitual and unthinking coupling of perception and action often identified as 
characteristic of skill (Gibson 2006, O’Connor 2007, Lea 2009). There is instead a constant 
informed attention to the potentials of the vine, and the needs of the task.  
4.4 The telling of stories 
The work in vineyards frequently involves the more experienced workers recounting local 
(hi)stories, which situate our activity within the wider historical landscapes of care: for vines, 
vineyards, and the future of the winery. The (hi)stories remind us of the multiple objects we are 
simultaneously caring for (Law 2010). In each vineyard pruning is re-valuated in light of the local 
context: a vine is not a vine is not a vine. Young Barbera vines at Vigna Nuova, replanted after a 
disease outbreak in the early 2000s, are being trained to produce fewer grapes and so Damian 
instructs us to leave only a few bunches on each vine. The next day working similar Barbera vines 
at Vigna di Carla we leave many bunches. There the land is more flat, and we are told the soil 
contains less clay. This is seen to result in grapes of lower quality, destined for demijohn wine, 
and so thorough pruning is not seen as necessary. The shape and character of the land and 
history of the vines matters even within the same vineyard. 
During the first break, Damian gives us additional instructions. 
Damian: A technical observation, the top part of this vineyard has suffered [the lack of rain] more, 
so if there are fewer grapes per plant there that is absolutely fine. (...) Because it’s much drier 
there. Down here 12 grape bunches per plant are fine, up there – no.  
Peter: There is another explanation here. When we planted this vineyard there were a few very 
dry years. The roots never reached a certain length, they remained quite short, so if there is no 
water they really can’t get any. 
Francesca: But doesn’t it grow more roots, over the years? 
Peter: Yes, but very slowly, because the soil is very compacted. (...) They’re like babies that did 
not get enough to eat when they were little. 
(field diary 07/05/09) 
Telling stories, as opposed to recounting facts, Mol (2008) notes, is characteristic of the logic of 
care. ‘While conflicting arguments work against each other, conflicting stories tend to enrich 
each other. And while adding up arguments leads to a conclusion, adding on stories is more 
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likely to be a way of rising more questions’ (ibid p. 88). The vineyard and winery stories were 
not so much authoritative statements expressing a truth about particular materials and spaces, 
as cues for the guiding of perception so that the knowledge expressed (vines differ, the differing 
spans past and future, the differing requires a change in practice) could be rediscovered by the 
novice workers as they engaged with the vines (see Ingold 2011, p. 159). Although the character 
of the soil and the history of the weather and the vines were not perceptible there and then, 
through the telling of the vineyard’s stories they were incorporated into our care.  
In addition to the thinking-backwards and thinking-forwards, we were also encouraged to think 
‘sideways’, considering the relations of which the vine was part. These relations were always 
materialising in the bodies of vines, whose every property could be seen as a condensed story 
(Ingold 2011, p. 30). Being attentive to these relations, and appreciating their power, we could 
become more sensitive to how our relation with the vine (through pruning) fitted in the wider 
mesh, and thus to care for them better. Storytelling encouraged us to note the differences in 
the flesh of the vines, to relate them to potential relational causes, and so to adapt our practice 
to the weaknesses and strengths of different vines and vineyards.  
4.5 Experience and authority, and their limits 
The more senior workers had a larger repertoire of experiences and stories to call upon at each 
instance of pruning, resulting in a greater sensitivity to the cues offered by the vine and the 
vineyard, considering, as Damian once said, a thousand things at the same time. To them the 
vines and vineyards afforded more than to the novice; they were more affected by the vines and 
vineyards (Latour 2004). They also stayed in daily communication with the winemaker and the 
cooperative founder, aligning the tasks in the vineyards with the needs of the wines. The more 
skilled and knowledgeable workers held greater authority (Sennett 2008), and were depended 
on for overseeing the work of others, for offering advice, and at times for making decisions about 
who would be allowed to work at all in situations when making mistakes was seen as too costly.   
This is not to say, however, that through spending time working the vineyards one  automatically 
became more attuned to the materiality of vines, or that all the experienced workers were 
attuned to the vines at all times. Just as the vines differed in their affordances, so the vineyard 
workers differed in their affective potential. Nilo was known as a ‘butcher’ as the vines he 
pruned were done harshly, without much individual attention and care. Damian in contrast was 
known as ‘the gardener’, or ‘mummy’ (la mamma). His constant careful attention epitomised 
the artisan-like, self-intensifying engagement with the world which tends to dominate work 
practice analysis in practice theory approaches (Bissell 2009). That was the reason why he and 
not another were the caposquadra (team leader). 
However even for Damian staying attuned and careful required effort. Engaging with the vines 
in a meaningful way – seeing and perceiving – depended both on the nonhuman charisma 
(Lormier 2007) of the vines, and the affective capacity of the mindbodies of the workers. The 
attunement to the materiality of vines varied between individuals, and was different at different 
times. Working long hours bent in two, in increasingly hot weather brought the risk of ‘switching 
to autopilot’, as Damian called it, and making mistakes. Developing vine working skill was not 
the case of affordances and affects coming effortlessly together. It required constant and 
conscious, tiring mindfulness. The effort of skill implies both the possibility of mistake and failure, 
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and a differentiation to more-and-less capable practitioners (see also Lea 2009). This limit to skill 
was indeed visible in the vineyard work. Early on in the spring pruning one of the workers was 
taken off the team as she ‘just wasn’t getting it’, costing the team too many grape bunches in a 
low yielding season. Similarly, at times we would come across vines which had been pruned 
without a spur, a mistake made in the winter pruning. This and other examples highlight the 
underlying chance not just of slippage, but of radical failure, without which this skill would not 
be skill at all, but a physiological function like breathing or digesting (see also Harrison 2009.  
4.6 Care and uncertainty 
While the experienced viticulturists in collaboration with winemakers led the way in vineyard 
work, this is not to say they did so on the basis of a perfect knowledge of the vines and vineyards, 
understood as a complete mastery over the vineyards as ‘systems’. Their skill did not derive from 
a certainty about past and future cause effect relationships which are a pre-requisite of such 
managerial knowing (Adam 1998, pp. 81-82). Indeed vineyard work was characterised by a 
recognised uncertainty, or even indeterminacy, of cause-effect relationships, characteristic of 
care practices (Mol 2008). Having observed aberrance in the unfolding of the vines, experienced 
workers considered many possible causes and many possible effects. This related to everyday 
decisions about the pruning of singular vines, but also more widely to the caring for vineyards 
and the company.   
The following two examples provide an illustration. As the spring turned to summer, the 
experienced workers noted there were fewer grape bunches than usual. Some vineyards in fact 
had produced hardly any grapes at all. This unexpected scarcity was much debated within the 
vineyard team. Tentative cause-effect relationships were proposed. Damian and Lena suggested 
the scarcity could be attributed to the impact of the spring weather two years previously. They 
also proposed it may have been exacerbated by the blinding of too many buds last winter. 
Virgilio brought to bear the outbreak of powdery mildew last year when the buds were forming. 
He also suggested the vines regularly went through low yield vintages. All these possible 
explanations were held as probable, and there were no attempts made to either ‘deny’ or 
‘confirm’ the causal links. Instead of trying to determine what the cause was, the viticulturists 
worked on what could be done. A decision was made to adjust the pruning practice and not 
blind any more buds next winter, in the hope of improving the yield. 
This approach was consistent with the logic of care explored by Mol (2008). As she notes, in the 
logic of care there is no ‘single, crucial moment when all relevant fact-values are available. 
Problems emerge and as they are tackled new problems arise’ (ibid p. 54). In the logic of care 
the impossibility of a God’s eye point of view is explicit, and decisions are made not on the basis 
of objective facts, which are always beyond reach, but from subjective stances. The 
experimental and open-ended character of the decision is acknowledged, and the results are 
monitored. In the case of failure, a different approach is considered. This was well illustrated by 
the story of the low-yielding vineyard di fronte Virgilio. Over the years, different attempts have 
been made at increasing the productivity of this vineyard by changing the vine training system 
from Guyot to cordone speronato, and back again. The same type of vine (Timorasso) performed 
well in other vineyards, but just in that place it yielded nothing but branches, although it was 
subject to the same care and work, and although the vines suffered no visible illness. It was 
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decided a new approach would be tried, the vines would be ripped out the following winter, and 
new clones tried out in the unsuccessful patch. There was a limit to care there, and the time had 
come to let go (Mol 2008, p. 54).  
For the viticulturists uncertainty about cause-effect relationships was expected. Past 
experiences and knowledges gained from other sources (friends, neighbours, even viticulture 
consultants) were brought in to inform observations of what was taking place in the present, 
but they were not depended on to deliver certainty about the past or the future. Past and future 
remained unbounded and indeterminate. The materiality of the vines was engaged with 
experimentally. Many elements of the experiment were known: unblinded buds will produce 
shoots; new vine clones will live. But some were not known: will the shoots carry grapes? Will 
the new clones produce a better yield? Previous experience and acquired knowledge provided 
possibilities, but not certainties.  
Furthermore, there was no suggestion that such certainty was achievable. Viticulturists did not 
consider that complex agro-nature of vines and vineyards could be known in the scientific or 
managerial sense (Adam 1998, Mol 2008). Rather, the experiential knowing of vines and 
vineyards as ‘processes rather than substances, irregular in their unfolding, open to other events, 
fluctuating in their identity’ led viticulturists at Colli Verdi to an approach Mazis names ‘a 
knowing of indeterminacy’ (Mazis 1999, cited in Hinchliffe 2001, p. 185). They knew that 
complete knowledge of vines was not a realistic ambition. Viticulturists’ knowing of 
indeterminacy did not indicate a lack, an end to otherwise successful control. The dream of 
control (Singleton and Law 2013) was never there in the first place. Instead care was practiced, 
with its typical flexible adaptation and an acceptance of uncertainty (Mol 2008). The workers 
knew – they had seen, over and over again – that vines and vineyards are open to endless 
relations and unforeseeable events; after all the vines grow, as one viticulturist put it, ‘under 
this sky’ (Vasco 25/02/2009). Their aim was not to produce knowledge about vineyards, but a 
knowledgeable practice of working with vineyards. Thus not control but creative tuning 
(Pickering 1995) of practice and material over long periods of time and across different vineyards 
was an extension of the skilful engagement with singular vines in singular encounters 
5. Conclusions: the dependence of care on situated expertise, and its implications  
The notion of care is becoming central to the reconceptualisation of agrarian space and practice. 
What this article argued is that care as the totality of those activities which enable the 
maintenance, continuation, and repair of the farming ‘world’, to paraphrase Fisher and Tronto’s 
(1991) classic definition, depends on experiential knowledge. Feminist critiques of care have 
pointed out that care requires both know-what and know-how, as it depends on one’s ability to 
first recognise and then appropriately react to the identified need (Tronto 1993). This article 
further explored the inter-dependence between knowledge and care in the context of vine work, 
arguing that the skills and attitudes authors such as Tronto (1993), Mol (2008) and de la 
Bellacasa (2010) have identified as central to caring are also those that can only be developed 
through acquiring situated expertise.  
According to Tronto (1993) care requires attentiveness, the ability to note the need; 
responsibility, a recognition that one’s position and knowledge give them an imperative to act; 
and competency, the ability to act according to the need. Mol (2008) further notes that in the 
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logic of care knowledge, action, and value are not separate, but are enacted together. What 
characterises care is not a detached analysis of available facts, but a careful experimentation by 
an involved actor who recognises that not all can be known, but that something has to be done 
nonetheless. What these authors recognise as pre-requisites for and characteristics of care are 
also what Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) recognise as characteristic of expertise. While novices 
obey rules, have a limited sensitivity to the world of action, and assume no personal 
responsibility, experts have a high awareness of the world in which they act, take responsibility 
for their actions, and respond accordingly not on the basis of certainty but through intuition. 
Expert behaviour is also characterised by openness and experimentation, and a dedication to 
continuous engagement.  
An autoethnographic account of acquiring competency in vine work illustrated that experiential 
and embodied learning is central to developing good care, and that engagement with the 
materiality of the world of action – plants, vineyards, and winery – is crucial to developing 
situated expertise. Situated expertise was shown to be acquired not by observation and 
repetition, but through a process of personal discovery of the new affordances of the world and 
of one’s mind-body emerging simultaneously and developing side by side. This process was 
aided by the recounting of (hi)stories and rules of thumb by more experienced practitioners, 
which helped to situate immediate action within the wider temporal and spatial contexts of care 
for multiple human and non-human others. However, while these interactions may have pointed 
the novice in the right direction, the learner was the one who had to make sense of them 
through repeated practical engagement. 
In this concluding section I would like to move beyond the ethnographic material presented in 
the article and tease out some wider implications of recognising that situated expertise is central 
to delivering care in farming. What the ethnographic material illustrated was how situated 
expertise enables viticulturists to attend to their local cares: for the vines, vineyards, winery, 
workforce, and others. However, in addition to attending to these local cares farmers are 
increasingly required to care about a growing network of proximate and distant others, including 
diseases (Ilbery et al. 2012, Law and Mol 2008), ecologies (Burgess 2000, Kaljonen 2006, Morris 
2006, Riley 2008), watersheds, carbon, and others. They are incentivised to take account of 
these non-local cares through regulation and auditing, which can create tensions with the local 
cares of the farmers, as Singleton’s (2010) and Singleton and Law’s (2013) papers on cattle 
tagging well illustrate. The regulatory regimes which seek to deliver care beyond the farm 
struggle with the flexibility and adaptation typical of farmers’ activities, and see them as 
potentially endangering the aims of the larger systems. At the same time, as Singleton and Law 
(2013) show, delivering on these non-local cares depends on the capacity of the farmers to 
skilfully incorporate them into their principal concern of caring for the farm as an economic unit 
composed of various care-demanding humans and non-humans (Harbers 2010). 
A close analysis of the relationship between knowledge and care in this article leads me to 
suggest that in order to make these wider care practices, which tend to be centrally organised 
and audited, fit more harmoniously with existing farming practices, and thus be both more 
acceptable and effective, we need to more explicitly recognise the situated expertise of farmers, 
and acknowledge their local cares and the practices of attending to them. This explicit 
valorisation of local expertise as central to delivering multiple levels of care through farming 
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should be complimented by a recognition of uncertainty, intuition, and experimentation as 
typical of farming expertise. The preceding case study noted decisions taken by viticulturists, in 
collaboration with winemakers, did not depend on precise measurement, but on making 
probable causal links between processes. The viticulturists considered a large number of 
variables qualitatively rather than a small number of variables quantitatively (see also Peloquin 
and Berkes 2009, p. 534). Knowledgeable engagement between workers and vineyards was not 
a control and mastery over their local environments (as per Van der Ploeg 1993, p. 212), but 
rather had the character of skilful coping, a knowing of indeterminacy (Hinchliffe 2001).  
Classically, regulatory regimes struggle to accommodate uncertainty and adaptation. However, 
the recognition of uncertainty, the use of qualitative rather than quantitative information, and 
the role of intuition and experiment in decision making are all characteristic of high levels of 
expertise, and of the logic of care (Mol 2008). Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) have shown that while 
novice and competent performers rely on rational calculation, the jump to proficient and expert 
levels of skill is characterised by an increased dependence on intuition (see also Ingold 2000, 
Flyvbjerg 2001). Intuition in this context is to be understood not as guesswork or supernatural 
inspiration, but as what other writers on skill have described as maximum grip (Marleau Ponty 
2001), flow (Csikszentmihalyi 1990), or being in harmony in the world of action (O’Connor 2007), 
in other words the capacity to respond quickly and accurately to the contingencies of the 
situation ‘without the conscious analytical division of situations into parts and evaluation 
according to context-independent rules’ (Flyvbjerg 22 p. 2001). It is important to note that the 
positive role of intuition in decision-making has been noted in other contexts such as 
engineering (Wetmore 2008), agronomy (Richardson-Ngwenya 2012), medical practice (Carmel 
2013), and indigenous hunting (Anderson 2000, Ingold 2000, Peloquin and Berkes 2009). 
Intuitive action can then be understood as a form of intelligent behaviour, but one which goes 
beyond cognitivist understandings of humans as rational and calculating decision makers 
(Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 14), an understanding which typically underlies regulatory action. 
The centrality of situated expertise to care, explored in this article, suggests that a practical 
recognition of uncertainty, flexibility, and adaptation as characteristic of care and of expertise 
in farming, merit further attention by scholars and policymakers alike. As indicated by other 
authors (Singleton 2010, Enticott 2012), it is the local adaptation, tinkering, and 
acknowledgement of uncertainty which enables abstract principles and rules presented by 
scientific and managerial practices to be reproduced as part of care-full farming. While this 
connection merits further attention, this and other studies indicate that such flexibility and 
adaptation need to be recognised, valorised, and supported, for it is these breathing spaces 
which enable a translation of rules and principles into care – as action-oriented knowledge. This 
is not to say that farmers as local experts are infallible, or that scientific and policy approaches 
have nothing to contribute to farming practice – this is plainly not true, and positive examples 
of science-farming knowledge collaborations exist (see e.g. Failing et al. 2013), although more 
are being called for (MacMillan and Benton 2014). What I suggest is that a way to improve 
farmers’ delivery on non-local cares may be through a better integration of the practices of 
caring for distant or systemic others with existing farming practices, underlain by a recognition 
of and respect for farmers’ experiential knowledge. 
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1 These same characteristics can be seen as enchanting by those in a position to give in to the prolificacy 
of plants, see Hitchings (2003, 2006), and Jones and Cloke (2002) on plants in domesticated settings. 
2 Ryan (2011) notes the importance of taxonomy in the changing of our dominant understanding of 
plants from plants-in-use to singular forms de-contextualised from their places, times, and use practices.  
3 All persons and companies in the text have been given pseudonyms. All direct quotes have been 
translated from Italian by the author. 
4 In this paper I have decided not to include the period of the harvest itself, as it is rather unusual when 
contrasted with the typical temporality of vine work (for an excellent analysis of grape harvest practices 
from a post-human perspective see Brice 2014). The harvest is characterised by an influx of workers 
from outside the winery, and an intense focus on the singular goal of getting the grapes into the winery 
at the right time. 
5 World Wide Opportunities on Organic Farms 
6 In this article I choose to use a direct translation from Italian (potatura verde) rather than the English 
term ‘thinning’ to indicate the continuity between winter and spring/summer activities. The pruning 
cuts made in winter belong to the same continual unfolding as the pruning of new shoots, leafs, and 
bunches. The vines are constantly worked as air circulation, pesticide penetration, ease of harvesting, 
making space for the developing fruit, shading or exposing it, removing secondary grape bunches, and 
other considerations come into play at different times of the year. 
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